Drug Courier Profiles and Their Legitimacy
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Drug Courier Profiles and Their Legitimacy:
“...Whatever remains, no matter how improbable, must be the answer...”
To what extent is a police officer’s specialized experience and/or training relevant in determining whether the officer had a reasonable suspicion to detain, or employ a sniffer dog? For example, is the “drug courier profile” a legitimate tool of law enforcement? (R. v. Chehil, 2013 SCC 49; R. v. MacKenzie, 2013 SCC 50.)?
Despite the case law of R. v. Chehil and R. v. Mackenzie, which give a tepid approval of the use of drug sniffer dogs on the loosely defined basis of “objective and ascertainable facts”, the “totality of the circumstances” as well as relevant training-based judgment of the police, a “drug courier profile” and “specialized experience/training” informing reasonable suspicion to detain often manifests itself as a carte-blanche to detain in the real world based on a generalized suspicion. Moreover, a “drug courier profile” can often be used to hide racial prejudice, condone racial profiling, and, as a compendium of cases cited in United States v. Hooper will show, has often been seen as being inconsistent and liberally applied to detain based on the “totality of the circumstances” justification, while also leading to frequent violations of s.8 and s.9 of the Charter.
In Chehil, the approach that the courts have taken on the effective long-leash provided to law enforcement on this subject is one in which the police inquiry is seen as being condoned not only when it is “fact-based”, but also when it is “flexible and grounded in common sense and practical, everyday experience”[1]. A careful weighing of Charter rights, while appropriate and well thought-out in the decision of Chehil, will have the unintended consequence of permitting and condoning the continued use of “drug courier profiles” as well as “specialized experience” for reasonable suspicion to detain, with the police often relying on the “totality of the circumstances” in an attempt to circumvent the necessity for more “fact-based” policing.
Addressing the specifics of “training and experience”, in Chehil, the court held that:
… “An officer's training and experience may provide an objective experiential, as opposed to empirical, basis for grounding reasonable suspicion. However, this is not to say that hunches or intuition grounded in an officer's experience will suffice, or that deference is owed to a police officer's view of the circumstances based on her training or experience in the field.”[2]
The court did, however, provide a caution when using a drug courier profile:
… “In my view, it is unhelpful to speak of profiling as generating reasonable suspicion. The term itself suggests an assessment based on stereotyping and discriminatory factors, which have no place in the reasonable suspicion analysis… Characteristics identified by a police profile can be considered when evaluating reasonable suspicion; however, profile characteristics are not a substitute for objective facts that raise a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Profile characteristics must be approached with caution precisely because they risk undermining a careful individualized assessment of the totality of the circumstances.”[3]
The case of Mackenzie also attempts to balance competing Charter rights, and while it may have done so successfully, a real-world application has left it open to the police to engage in the rampant use of profiling under the guise of “reasonable suspicion” while looking for the “possibility of criminal behavior in light of the totality of the circumstances”[4]. Moreover, Mackenzie addresses the use of specialized officer experience in a much more liberal manner than Chehil, going so far as to justify its use on the basis that the “cost to individual privacy is accepted as a reasonable one in part because properly conducted sniff searches are minimally intrusive, narrowly targeted and highly accurate”[5]. The court acknowledges the byproduct of their upholding of the definition of “reasonable suspicion” as such, stating that: “While more innocent persons will be caught under a reasonable suspicion standard than under the reasonable and probable grounds standard, that is the logical consequence of the way these standards have been defined.”[6]
In Mackenize, the court elaborated on the issue of reasonable expectations of privacy as well as the nature and the use of sniffer dogs:
“Police may use sniffer dogs for routine crime prevention in contexts where individuals have a reasonable, but lesser expectation of privacy and the police have reasonable grounds to suspect that a search will reveal evidence of a criminal offence. The use of sniffer dogs as a police investigative technique should be approached one case at a time, in each instance having regard to the context of the situation, balancing the extent of any privacy interest and the state’s countervailing interest in law enforcement.”[7]
They ultimately concluded, however, that judicial scrutiny is more important than added restraints to police powers, as well as that a significant weight will be attached to subjective factors such as officer experience:
“…Reasonable suspicion must be grounded in objectively discernible facts, which can then be subjected to independent judicial scrutiny…Officer training and experience can play an important role in assessing whether the reasonable suspicion standard has been met… Reasonable suspicion must be assessed against the totality of the circumstances…”[8]
Before we address Canadian jurisprudence outside of Chehil and Mackenzie, on the issue of the legitimization of the use of drug courier profiles and their potentially racially discriminatory nature, the case of United States v. Hooper, 935 F.2d 484, 499 (2d Cir. 1991) must be brought up as a general introduction to drug courier profiles and their inconsistencies. A dissent by Circuit Judge George C. Pratt captures the problem with the use of profiles perfectly, and in a very biting and derisive manner as well. He states, after reference a conversation from Alice Through the Looking-Glass (1872) between Humpty Dumpty and Alice on the use of words, and their ability to mean different things at different times based on what the ‘master’ wants: “This case presents another example of the erosion of our constitutional protections resulting from this country’s wasteful, ineffective, self-destructive efforts to stop drug trafficking.”[9]
The argument by the government for the search of Hooper’s bag was that Mr. Hooper had come from a source city and fit the profile compiled by the DEA of a drug courier. Tearing through the submissions by the government, Justice Pratt wittily pointed out that “yet the government conceded at oral argument that a ‘source city’ for drug traffic was virtually any city with a major airport, a concession that was met with deserved laughter in the courtroom”[10]. Moreover, on the aspect of the specifics of the drug courier profile itself, Justice Pratt held that it was “similarly laughable”, as “it is so fluid that it can be used to justify designating anyone a potential drug courier if the DEA agents so choose”[11]. Citing the case of United States v. Taylor, 917 F.2d 1402, 1407 n. 8 (6th Cir. 1990), vacated, 925 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1991), he points out in a tongue-in-cheek manner that “The [DEA] has not committed the profile to writing and the combination of factors looked for varies amongst agents”[12], and from the case of United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413, 1418 9th Cir.1987, rev’d, 490 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 1989, that drug couriers have a “chameleon-like way of adapting to any particular set of observations”, as can be seen below.
As per Hooper, the following have been singled out as some of the contradictory aspects of relied-upon profiling and observations which resulted in the detention of individuals on the suspicion of them being drug-couriers (and often argued on the ‘totality of the circumstances’ as a justification) – a list of their “chameleon-like way” as mentioned above, so to speak. These individuals “arrived late at night”[13], “arrived early in the morning”[14], “one of first to deplane”[15], “one of last to deplane”[16], “deplaned in the middle”[17], “used a one-way ticket”[18], “used a round-trip ticket”[19], “carried brand-new luggage”[20] , “carried a small gym bag”[21], “travelled alone”[22], “travelled with a companion”[23], “acted too nervous”[24], “acted too calm”[25], “wore expensive clothing and gold jewelry”[26], “dressed in black corduroys, white pull over shirt, loafers without socks”[27], “dressed in dark slacks, work shirt, and hat”[28], “dressed in brown leather aviator jacket, gold chain, hair down to shoulders”[29], “dressed in loose-fitting sweatshirt and denim jacket”[30], “walked rapidly through airport”[31], “walked aimlessly through airport”[32], “flew in to Washington National Airport on the LaGuardia Shuttle”[33], “had a white handkerchief in his hand”[34].
The absolutely ridiculous nature of these observations goes to show that anyone could potentially qualify as fitting within a drug courier profile, and the subsequent detention and breach of s.8 and s.9 Charter rights for many individuals that would ensue could potentially result in a few successful arrests of drug couriers. As is stated in Mackenzie, it is simply a “logical consequence” that“more innocent persons will be caught” under this “reasonable suspicion” standard that the court upheld[35].
Moving on to Canadian jurisprudence, the Ontario Court of Appeal case of R. v. Calderon, 2004 CanLII 7569, illustrates how wide a net must be cast so that a few successes may be had when using the unreliable “drug courier profiles”.
A white Lincoln was stopped for ‘speeding’ (or so stated the official reason provided, that is; though it should be noted that the term “speeding” here was rather relative, and somewhat arbitrary, as the vehicle was only travelling about 10km/hr over the posted speed limit which is a very common-place practice by the vast majority of drivers. In fact, one could argue that not going above the speed limit is more suspicious, as is stated in the Drug Interdiction on the I-95 in Volusia County, Florida in 1986 documentary than the norm of 5-10km/hr over the posted limit).
Once the vehicle was stopped, the two Ontario Provincial Police officers at the scene attempted to employ the knowledge they had gained from their drug interdiction courses to see if it fit the drug courier profile.
Not unlike the many criteria/indicia/drug courier profiles mentioned above in Hooper, these individuals as well fit into the “chameleon-like way of adapting to any particular set of observations”, as they had fast food, a map, cellular phones, pagers, and luggage (amongst other indicia). Because of this, the police officers decided to search the vehicle and seized a large amount of marijuana. At court, the success rate of their “profile” was addressed. Not unsurprisingly, it came out that this was their first successful stop out of nearly 100 combined attempts at searching innocent individuals that fit this overly generic profile of essentially anyone that is travelling by car.
Influenced, and somewhat disturbed by the lack success of their courier profile (though implicitly condoning the use of profiling), Justice Laskin held that: "given the neutrality and apparent unreliability of these indicators, I fail to see how their presence could amount to reasonable grounds for detention."[36]
Unfortunately, it seems that we have not advanced nearly as far as we would like to think in our attempts to overcome our racial stereotyping, to put it mildly, as at trial the officer testified that amongst the reasons for his suspicion was the fact that the vehicle did not fit what the driver and the passenger should have been in – essentially admitting that he did not think that the two ‘brown’ men could have afforded such a car through legitimate means. Ironically, such a position is also taken as a reason to be suspicious by the police in other drug courier cases – as was shown in the documentary on Drug Interdiction on the I-95 in Volusia County, Florida in 1986[37]. Coincidentally, the interviewee in that video also seemed to realize the uncomfortable nature of the proposition that racial profiling (namely that someone is driving a car that does not fit their “look”) is a tool used in courier-profiling; and this was nearly 20 years before Calderon. In terms of public perception and general knowledge, this exact same recurring profiling situation that took place in Calderon in 2004, and was part of the general unwritten guidelines Florida in 1986, is mocked in the recent 2012 film release of “Men in Black 3” – referencing it as being common-place in the United States during the late 1960s.
The case of R. v. Kang-Brown, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 456, 2008 SCC 18, also addressed the use of drug-courier profiling – and the laughable nature of the indicators used by the RCMP to justify detention. The court here held that a public space affords a greater protection to an individual from a random drug sniffing dog search when the search is not specifically authorized at law. In Kang-Brown, the police stopped an accused as he was disembarking from a Greyhound bus. Looking at him, they noticed that he seemed to avoid their stares, and seemed uncomfortable. When they confronted Mr. Brown due to his apparently “suspicious” behavior and went to check his bag for narcotics, Mr. Brown reacted by trying to move the bag away from the officers. When the RCMP officer called for a sniffer dog, which subsequently indicated the existence of drugs in the bag and on his person, Mr. Brown was searched and arrested. In this case, the profiling techniques that the RCMP were using belonged to a new program called: “Operation Pipeline/Convoy/Jetway (OPCJ)”.
As Tanovich states in his 2008 paper titled: “A Powerful Blow Against Police Use of Drug Courier Profiles”[38], the drug-courier profile of Operation Jetway included such factors as eye-contact (“most individuals with nothing to hide, when initial eye contact is made, will simply continue on their way. On the other hand, drug couriers will give an analytical look back as if faced with a potential threat”), enhanced nervousness (“drug couriers, after initial eye contact is made, will display indicators of nervousness such as, chewing on the lips, shaking a leg, and laboring when swallowing”), and rubber necking (“after initial eye contact is made, and if you move away and/or behind drug couriers, they will do a complete 180 degree turn of the head to determine where you are”), as well as other factors.[39] Professor Tanovich also points out other generic factors in that one particular drug courier profile (a profile that, as we have seen, that is always changing from operation to operation and case to case), which included in this case: “purchasing a one-way ticket, last minute purchase of a ticket, and paying in cash”[40] – factors that, according to the RCMP, must certainly be suspicious when buying a bus ticket. The RCMP also had other generic indicators of potential drug-couriers, including:
“male, aged 25 to 35 years; travelling alone from a source city; having luggage with no visible identification tags; either over or under dressed; luggage seemingly inappropriate for the type of travel; users of cell phones; speedy departure from terminal to transportation links outside”[41].
Fittingly, Justice Binnie found that such indicators did not come close to “reasonable suspicion”, holding that:
… “If "eye contact" or "no eye contact" are both of concern to the RCMP, this seems an ambiguous basis for particularized suspicion. Everyone getting off the bus will either be making eye contact or not making eye contact.”[43] [and that] “I think we can take judicial notice of the fact that people travelling by bus frequently buy their tickets not long before boarding. There is no evidence that cash payments are unusual.”[44]
Moreover, the dissent at the Alberta Court of Appeal addressed the unmentioned possibility of racial profiling, at paragraph 98, in which they referred to the “unconscious effects of race informing suspicion”[45], despite the refusal by the majority to address the issue as it was not brought up at trial.
Finally, there is the case of R. v. Monney, (1999), 133 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.), in which the court has “judicially sanctioned” the following drug-courier profile – though as per R. v. Marin, [1994] O.J. No. 1280 (Ont. Gen Div.), the Canadian Border Service Agency must take the following indicia together, and not separately in order to have the “requisite reasonable suspicion to conduct a strip search or drug loo search pursuant to section 98(1)(a) of the Customs Act” [46]:
“…nervousness; displays of anger or agitation; pitch or tone in a person's voice; overly friendly demeanour; unusual amount of luggage for duration of trip; unusual body movements or words used to divert attention; place of travel (Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago); frequent trips to source or transit countries; gender; according to the CISC 1998 Annual Report "couriers tend to be females in their early 20s to mid 30s"; red eyes and/or white and pasty tongue; tickets purchased shortly before departure; tickets purchased with cash; low-paying job or unemployed; evasive or inconsistent answers; inability to provide receipts of stay; transportation at airport via taxi;”[47]
Underlying issues of racial profiling and inherent racism also mar the use of drug-courier profiles. Though not explicitly addressed by the courts in the aforementioned cases, the issue is real. As Tanovich states, citing the 1997 Criminal Intelligence Service Canada report (CISC, a related, RCMP-like entity), that the use of an obviously racialized drug-courier profiling has resulted in a quasi-criminal perception of certain ethnic groups:
“Criminal elements within various Caribbean immigrant communities are still involved in street level cocaine sales. In Western Canada the involvement of Asian-based crime groups in cocaine trafficking is increasing. Iranians, Romanians, Lebanese, Jamaican, Korean and South Americans are increasingly involved in the importation and trafficking of cocaine while Chinese, Vietnamese and Laotians are stepping up their connections at all levels of cocaine trafficking. Vietnamese traffickers from Alberta control the distribution of cocaine in the Northwest Territories.”[48]
Moreover, the 2006 report by the CISC still alludes to the perceived racial characteristics of the traffickers, stating that: “those with higher levels of criminal capabilities are largely represented by a number of Asian criminal groups in the B.C. Lower Mainland and southern Ontario.”[49]
Also problematic, aside from the over-broad nature of the courier profiles, is the large number of false positives that arise when using the drug courier profile and the sniffer-dogs, which further detract from the already questionable validity of its use as a “legitimate tool of law-enforcement”. The Canada Customs and Revenue Agency keeps data on the success and failure rates of their screening methods for drug couriers at Pearson International Airport. The procedure when one is deemed a suspect via sniffer-dog or other method is the “super-loo” room, in which one is “compelled to sit in a room, […] until they produced a bowel movement”[50]. Over a 26 month duration, “in the 536 cases analyzed, the false positive rate at Terminal 1 was 75 percent. At Terminals 2 and 3, it was 79 percent and 83 percent, respectively.”[51] Despite at best a 25% success rate, at worst a 17% success rate, and logically an incredibly intrusive violation of basic dignity, not to mention an individual’s s.8 and s.9 Charter rights, the drug sniffer dog program at Person International Airport is still in effect to this day, with the cuts to the program by Stephan Harper being done not out of concern for the numerous false positives, but rather due to budgetary cuts as it costs $100,000 to start-up a dog team[52].
The issue of the “super-loo”, is also addressed in Monney, where the court reaches the conclusion that in a system of competing rights, they are a necessary evil. I would, respectfully, disagree with the conclusion that the court reached, where they refer to the “super-loo” rooms as necessary for the protection of the state interest of the security of Canada’s borders. Given that the dates of the data collected by CCRA on the false positives was roughly in the two year period surrounding 2004, Monney did not have advantage of considering the empirical data before announcing that this is merely a ‘price to be paid’ as a ‘potential embarrassment’ for the greater good:
“While I conclude that the compelled production of a urine sample or a bowel movement is an embarrassing process, it does not interfere with a person’s bodily integrity, either in terms of an interference with the “outward manifestation” of an individual’s identity, as was the central concern in Stillman, or in relation to the intentional application of force, as was relevant in Simmons. As is the case with other investigation techniques in the second category such as a strip search, subjecting travellers crossing the Canadian border to potential embarrassment is the price to be paid in order to achieve the necessary balance between an individual’s privacy interest and the compelling countervailing state interest in protecting the integrity of Canada’s borders from the flow of dangerous contraband materials. Accordingly, I find that the border search conducted by the customs officers in the circumstances of this appeal was reasonable for the purposes of s. 8 of the Charter.” [Monney, para 48]
In Kang-Brown the issue of sniffer-dog reliability is addressed, however the court only speaks of “proof of accuracy” from an evidentiary perspective. In R. v. A.M., 2008 SCC 19, the issues surrounding false positives and the weaknesses of sniff-dogs are acknowledged, though not potentially in the large quantities that the data at Pearson International Airport had shown, with the court attempting to weigh individual concerns of the person against the perspective of the state and the police that have as a pressing objective the protection of the borders from drug-couriers. In an attempt to balance the two, the court sides with the government objectives, stating however that if the admission of the evidence obtained by potentially unreliable dogs truly is an issue, then it is one to be remedied by an application under s.24(2).
“From the police perspective, a dog that fails to detect half of the narcotics present is still better than no detection at all. However from the perspective of the general population, a dog that falsely alerts half of the time raises serious concerns about the invasion of the privacy of innocent people. An important concern for the court is therefore the number of any such false positives. It is important not to treat the capacity and accuracy of sniffer dogs as interchangeable. Dogs are not mechanical or chemical devices. Moreover, the sniff does not disclose the presence of drugs. It discloses the presence of an odour that indicates either the drugs are present or may have been present but are no longer present, or that the dog is simply wrong. In the sniffer-dog business, there are many variables. [para. 82] [paras. 84-85] [paras. 87-88]”
Revisiting the two key cases, we come back to Chehil and Mackenzie; the two most recent cases on the topic of the use of drug-courier profiles, a police officer’s specialized experience and/or training relevant regarding a reasonable suspicion to detain, and the use of sniffer dogs. In Chehil in the summary, the court has held that “An officer's training and experience may provide an objective experiential, as opposed to empirical, basis for grounding reasonable suspicion”, and have qualified that statement by adding that a lack of legislated standards means that “a police officer's educated guess must not supplant the rigorous and independent scrutiny demanded by the reasonable suspicion standard”. Differentiating between “generalized” suspicion and reasonable suspicion, the court states at paragraphs 29-30 that:
“Reasonable suspicion must be assessed against the totality of the circumstances. The inquiry must consider the constellation of objectively discernible facts that are said to give the investigating officer reasonable cause to suspect that an individual is involved in the type of criminal activity under investigation. This inquiry must be fact-based, flexible, and grounded in common sense and practical, everyday experience”
At paragraph 62 in Mackenzie, the court comes out quite strongly in favor of giving significant weight to the training and experience that officers have and their ability to come to their own conclusions based on this training on the topic of meeting the “reasonable suspicion” standard, which, at paragraph 63, the court says must be viewed through the eyes of a reasonable person imagining they were the police officer:
“Officer training and experience can play an important role in assessing whether the reasonable suspicion standard has been met. Police officers are trained to detect criminal activity. That is their job. They do it every day. And because of that, "a fact or consideration which might have no significance to a lay person can sometimes be quite consequential in the hands of the police" (Yeh, at para. 53). Sights, sounds, movement, body language, patterns of behaviour, and the like are part of an officer's stock in trade and courts should consider this when assessing whether their evidence, in any given case, passes the reasonable suspicion threshold.”
Despite the holding in Mackenzie, the summary of the dissent is very important as, in the eyes of this author, it has essentially hit the nail on the head regarding the real-world effect that these rulings will have – a tacit approval of the generalized suspicion that many police officers have and then attempt to justify as “reasonable” before the courts:
“The police cannot simply draw on their experience in the field to create broad categories of "suspicious" behaviour into which almost anyone could fall. Such an approach risks transforming the already flexible standard of reasonable suspicion into the "generalized" suspicion standard that has been rejected in the past.”
The use of the drug-courier profiles, and of arbitrary standards in determining what does and does not qualify as a characteristic worth looking out for has resulted in a generalized suspicion that can encapsulate a majority of individuals at any source city, which is also very loosely defined.
Unfortunately, in cases such as Monney, the use of drug-courier profiles did not pose a problem; it was, in fact, sanctioned by the courts.
On the other hand, cases such as Kang-Brown and Calderon have attempted to limit what qualifies as “reasonable suspicion” as well as pointing out the absurdity of these drug-courier profiles as being able to encapsulate too many innocent people. In these cases, s.8 and s.9 Charter violations were not able to be argued away as necessary for the “greater good”.
Despite the well articulated holdings of the courts, still the core issues are a pervasive generalized suspicion standard that masquerades itself as “reasonable suspicion” through such devices as “drug courier profiles” that can encapsulate many innocents, even when the factors are taken holistically, as can be seen by cases such as Calderon, Kang-Brown, and my anecdote in which I fit all seven of the criteria needed for “reasonable suspicion” – which doesn’t seem reasonable at all. Also to be considered are the hidden racial and prejudicial undertones that are present in many of these “profiles”, quite often at the unspoken level.
Finally, the few numbers that do exist on the topic of the reliability of sniffer dogs show many false positives, despite a potential individual dog success rate in certain cases, and an overall success rate of 15-25% over a sample size of 500+ searches over a 26 month period raises serious concerns about the legitimacy of their use as a tool of law enforcement, as well as that of the use of the ‘overly-vague generalized-suspicion inducing but argued as reasonable-suspicion when the need arises’ drug-courier profiles.
The ends do not justify the means in this case.
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Table of Authorities
Case Law
R. v. A.M., 2008 SCC 19, [2008] S.C.J. No. 19
R. v. Calderon, 2004 CanLII 7569, [2004] O.J. No. 3474
R. v. Chehil, 2013 SCC 49; [2013] 3 S.C.R. 220
R. v. Kang-Brown, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 456, 2008 SCC 18
R. v. MacKenzie, 2013 SCC 50, [2013] S.C.J. No. 50
R. v. Marin, [1994] O.J. No. 1280 (Ont. Gen Div.), 24 W.C.B. (2d) 257.
R. v. Monney, (1999), 133 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 652
United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29, 31 2d Cir.1980.
United States v. Chambers, 918 F.2d 1455, 1462 9th Cir. 1990.
United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469, 471 D.C. Cir. 1989;
United States v. Cooke, 915 F.2d 250, 251 6th Cir.1990.
United States v. Craemer, 555 F.2d 594, 595 6th Cir. 1977.
United States v. Flowers, 909 F.2d 145, 146 6th Cir. 1990.
United States v. Fry, 622 F.2d 1218, 1219 5th Cir.1980.
United States v. Garcia, 848 F.2d 58, 59 4th Cir., cert. denied, 488 U.S. 957, 109 S.Ct. 395, 102 L.Ed.2d 384 1988.
United States v. Garcia, 905 F.2d 557, 5.59 1st Cir., cert. denied, 498 U.S. 986, 111 S.Ct. 522, 112 L.Ed.2d 533 1990;
United States v. Gomez-Norena, 908 F.2d 497, 497 9th Cir.1990, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 947, 111 S.Ct 363, 112 L.Ed.2d 326 1991.
United States v. Himmelwright, 551 F.2d 991, 992 5th Cir., cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902. 98 S.Ct. 298, 54 L.Ed.2d 189 1977.
United States v. Hooper, 935 F.2d 484, 499 (2d Cir. 1991)
United States v. Johnson, 910 F.2d 1506 7th Cir.1990, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1051, 111 S.Ct. 764, 112 L.Ed.2d 783 1991;
United States v. McKines, 933 F.2d 1412 8th Cir.1991
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547 n. 1, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1873 n. 1, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 1980;
United States v. Millan, 912 F.2d 1014, 1017 8th Cir.1990.
United States v. Montilla, 928 F.2d 583, 58a 2d Cir.1991;
United States v. Moore, 675 F.2d 802, 803 6th Cir. 1982, cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1068, 103 S.Ct. 1521, 76
United States v. Nurse, 916 F.2d 20, 24 D.C.Cir. 1990.
United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81, 82 4th Cir.1989, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 1990.
United States v. Reid, 448 U.S. 438, 441, 100 S.Ct. 100 S.Ct. 2752, 2754, 65 L.Ed.2d 890 1980;L.Ed.2d 945 1983.
United States v. Rose, 889 F.2d 1490, 1491 6th Cir.1989.
United States v. Sanford, 658 F.2d 342, 343 5th Cir.1981, cert. denied, 455 U.S. 991 1982.
United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 882, 883 6th Cir.1978.
United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413, 1418 9th Cir.1987, rev’d, 490 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 1989,
United States v. Sterling, 909 F.2d 1078, 1079 7th Cir.1990;
United States v. Sullivan, 625 F.2d 9, 12 4th Cir. 1980
United States v. Taylor, 917 F.2d 1402, 1407 n. 8 (6th Cir. 1990), vacated, 925 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1991)
United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1414 8th Cir.1989, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 825, 111 S.Ct. 77, 112 L.Ed.2d 50 1990.
Secondary Sources
David Tanovich, University of Windsor, A Powerful Blow Against Police Use of Drug Courier Profiles, online: <http://cronus.uwindsor.ca/users/t/tanovich/bio.nsf/9d019077a3c4f6768525698a00593654/39 ca6e77c72219fc852574650052cb33/$FILE/APowerfulBlowAgainstPoliceUseofDrugCourierProfiles.pdf>.
Richard Brennan, The Toronto Star, Harper Government Gives Sniffer Dogs The Boot, online: < http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2012/04/13/harper_government_gives_sniffer_dogs_the_boot.html>.
Scott Phelps & Mason, The Laughable Drug Courier Profile, online: <http://www.spmlaw.ca/scdla/laughable_drug_courier_profile.pdf>
YouTube, Drug Interdiction on the I-95 in Volusia County, Florida in 1986, online: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fb4eJ-cxNZQ>.
Citations
[1] Chehil at sumey.
[2] Ibid at para 47.
[3] Ibid at paras 39-41.
[4] Mackenzie at summary.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Scott Phelps & Mason, The Laughable Drug Courier Profile, online: <http://www.spmlaw.ca/scdla/laughable_drug_courier_profile.pdf>
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] United States v. Nurse, 916 F.2d 20, 24 D.C.Cir. 1990.
[14] United States v. Reid, 448 U.S. 438, 441, 100 S.Ct. 2752, 2754, 65 L.Ed.2d 890 1980; United States v. Millan, 912 F.2d 1014, 1017 8th Cir.1990.
[15] United States v. Millan, 912 F.2d at 1015, United States v. Moore, 675 F.2d 802, 803 6th Cir. 1982, cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1068, 103 S.Ct. 1521, 76 L.Ed.2d 945 1983.
[16] United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547 n. 1, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1873 n. 1, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 1980; United States v. Sterling, 909 F.2d 1078, 1079 7th Cir.1990; United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1414 8th Cir.1989, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 825, 111 S.Ct. 77, 112 L.Ed.2d 50 1990.
[17] United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29, 31 2d Cir.1980.
[18] United States v. Johnson, 910 F.2d 1506 7th Cir.1990, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1051, 111 S.Ct. 764, 112 L.Ed.2d 783 1991; United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469, 471 D.C. Cir. 1989; United States v. Sullivan, 625 F.2d 9, 12 4th Cir. 1980.
[19] United States v. Craemer, 555 F.2d 594, 595 6th Cir. 1977.
[20] United States v. Taylor, 917 F.2d at 1403; United States v. Sullivan, 625 F.2d at 12.
[21] United States v. Sanford, 658 F.2d 342, 343 5th Cir.1981, cert. denied, 455 U.S. 991 1982.
[22] United States v. White, 890 F.2d at 1415; United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 882, 883 6th Cir.1978.
[23] United States v. Garcia, 905 F.2d 557, 5.59 1st Cir., cert. denied, 498 U.S. 986, 111 S.Ct. 522, 112 L.Ed.2d 533 1990; United States v. Fry, 622 F.2d 1218, 1219 5th Cir.1980.
[24] United States v. Montilla, 928 F.2d 583, 58a 2d Cir.1991; United States v. Cooke, 915 F.2d 250, 251 6th Cir.1990.
[25] United States v. McKines, 933 F.2d 1412 8th Cir.1991; United States v. Himmelwright, 551 F.2d 991, 992 5th Cir., cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902. 98 S.Ct. 298, 54 L.Ed.2d 189 1977.
[26] United States v. Chambers, 918 F.2d 1455, 1462 9th Cir. 1990.
[27] United States v. McKines, supra.
[28] United States v. Taylor, 917 F.2d at 1403.
[29] United States v. Millan, 912 F.2d at 1015.
[30] United States v. Flowers, 909 F.2d 145, 146 6th Cir. 1990.
[31] United States v. Millan, 912 F.2d at 1017; United States v. Rose, 889 F.2d 1490, 1491 6th Cir.1989.
[32] United States v. Gomez-Norena, 908 F.2d 497, 497 9th Cir.1990, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 947, 111 S.Ct 363, 112 L.Ed.2d 326 1991.
[33] United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81, 82 4th Cir.1989, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 1990.
[34] United States v. Garcia, 848 F.2d 58, 59 4th Cir., cert. denied, 488 U.S. 957, 109 S.Ct. 395, 102 L.Ed.2d 384 1988.
[35] Mackenzie at summary.
[36] Calderon at para 72.
[37] YouTube, Drug Interdiction on the I-95 in Volusia County, Florida in 1986, online: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fb4eJ-cxNZQ>.
[38] David Tanovich, University of Windsor, A Powerful Blow Against Police Use of Drug Courier Profiles, online: <http://cronus.uwindsor.ca/users/t/tanovich/bio.nsf/9d019077a3c4f6768525698a00593654/39 ca6e77c72219fc852574650052cb33/$FILE/APowerfulBlowAgainstPoliceUseofDrugCourierProfiles.pdf>.
[39] Tanovich at 1.
[40] Ibid at 2.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Fortunately, the story did have a happy ending; I made it to Finch Station by 8am, and then to Newmarket by 9am – just on time for the matter to be called.
[43] Kang-Brown at para 83.
[44] Ibid at para 88.
[45] R. v. Kang-Brown (2005), 31 C.R. (6th) 231 (Alta. Q.B.)
[46] Tanovich at 7.
[47] Ibid at 6, 7.
[48] Ibid at 2.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid at 8.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Richard Brennan, The Toronto Star, Harper Government Gives Sniffer Dogs The Boot, online: < http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2012/04/13/harper_government_gives_sniffer_dogs_the_boot.html>.
